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Abstract
Recent years have witnessed a growing aversion to immigration worldwide and, at the same time, radicalization of public 
opinion on the issue. This paper explores the relationship between media news and individual attitudes to immigration. We 
run an empirical analysis whereby an index capturing individuals’ pro-immigration attitude, measured in 19 countries, is 
regressed over indexes capturing the coverage and tone of media news about immigration. We find that pro-immigration 
attitudes are negatively correlated with media coverage and the negative tone of news. However, this correlation is significant 
only for those with high trust in the media. In the case of low trust, higher coverage of immigration and a negative news slant 
make previous preferences and beliefs vis-à-vis immigration more extreme, yielding a lower pro-immigration index for those 
politically on the right, while the opposite applies to those on the left. The pro-immigration index is constructed by means 
of fuzzy methods to account for the many aspects defining attitudes to immigration.
Keywords Attitudes to immigration · Fuzzy analysis · Media coverage and tone · Media news · Political orientation · Trust 
in media
JEL Classification H89 · J15 · Z190
Introduction
The recent increase in migratory inflows worldwide has 
dramatically changed host country attitudes to immigra-
tion. Two main facts seem to emerge: a growing aversion 
to immigration, and increasingly polarized public opinion, 
with politically left-leaning people more willing to accept 
immigration and right-leaning citizens strongly opposed to 
it (Semyonov et al., 2006; Rustenbach, 2010; Halla et al., 
2017; Stockemer et al., 2020). The mass media have paid 
great attention to the migration phenomenon, undoubtedly 
contributing to putting it at the center of the political debate 
and to forming the opinion of individuals in this regard 
(Vergeer et al. 2000; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007 
and 2009; Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden, 2007; Igartua 
and Cheng, 2009; Knoll et al., 2011; Merolla et al., 2013; 
Schemer, 2012; Hericourt and Spielvogel, 2014; Facchini 
et al., 2017; Benesch et al., 2019; Meltzer et al., 2020).
To appreciate, albeit only anecdotally, the great influence 
of the mass media in forming public opinion on immigra-
tion, suffice it to think that in September 2015 the mere 
publishing of a photograph of a Syrian child who died on 
a beach in Turkey was enough to raise the awareness of the 
tragedy of asylum seekers from Syria and to demand a politi-
cal response to the refugee problem.1
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1 September 2, 2015, saw the publication of a photograph of a 
3-year-old boy, Alan Kurdi, who lay dead on the beach of Bodrum 
(Turkey), following a shipwreck, in an attempt to seek asylum in Can-
ada. The photograph of Kurdi's body was published in a large number 
of newspapers around the world, and was widely reported on social 
media platforms. The shock to public opinion and media comments 
dramatically increased the demand for immediate political action and 
the will of political leaders to solve the Syrian refugee problem. Brit-
ish Prime Minister David Cameron, for example, stated in an inter-
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In this paper, we explore to what extent and through 
which channels the mass media may influence native atti-
tudes to immigration. In analyzing the effects of media 
news coverage, we consider prior beliefs of individuals as 
moderating factors of such influence, where prior beliefs are 
captured by individuals’ political orientation and their trust 
in mass media.
A large body of literature has analyzed how media news 
may affect the attitudes of individuals to immigration (see 
the two comprehensive surveys of Meltzer et al. (2017). To 
a lesser extent it has analyzed how media news interacts 
with individuals’ political orientation (Knoll et al., 2011; 
Merolla et al., 2013; Della Vigna et al., 2014). We add to this 
literature by showing that the effects of media news on atti-
tudes to immigration depend on the trust in media and on the 
political orientation of individuals. Our results indicate that 
extensive coverage of news on immigration raises concerns 
regarding immigration only when people have great trust 
in the media. In the case of little trust, exposure to news on 
immigration triggers a polarization of public opinion, erod-
ing the pro-immigration attitude in the case of right-leaning 
individuals, while enhancing it in the case of left-leaning 
individuals.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper high-
lighting the crucial role played by individuals’ trust in media 
in determining whether exposure to immigration news miti-
gates differences in pro-immigration attitudes of different 
groups of individuals, by favoring a convergence in opin-
ions, or exacerbates such differences.
In particular, we run a cross-sectional empirical analy-
sis conducted at individual and country level, where the 
dependent variable is an index measuring individuals’ pro-
immigration attitude, while the main variables of interest 
are the numbers of negatively slanted news items on immi-
gration and the number of all news items on immigration, 
irrespective of content. Both are calculated at country level 
and over different periods of time.
The pro-immigration attitude index is constructed by 
means of fuzzy sets theory to take into account attitudes 
such as trust in foreigners, desirability of ethnic diversity, 
and preferences for immigration policies, which together 
combine to define the preferences of individuals vis-à-vis 
immigration. One of the advantages of this index is to obtain 
a multidimensional and continuous measure of individual 
attitudes, rather than a measure based on just one aspect, 
as is usual in the literature.2 Data on individual attitudes to 
immigration were obtained from the World Value Survey 
(WVS) Wave 2005–2009 for 19 countries.3 From the WVS, 
we also retrieved several characteristics of respondents, 
including their trust in the media and their political orien-
tation. Data for news on immigration were obtained from 
the Bloomberg data set. Other sources were used to collect 
country level controls.
The influence of media news on public opinion is widely 
recognized by the political science and communication liter-
ature (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Erbring et al., 1980; Ent-
man, 1993). The media may affect public opinion through 
the saliency effect (or prime effect), which refers to the fact 
that when a topic is extensively covered by the media it 
becomes very prominent in public opinion (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972; Erbring et al., 1980; Hatton, 2017), and through 
the frame effect (or the tone effect), whereby the tone used 
by media also influences public opinion (Iyengar and Kinder, 
1987; Iyengar, 1991; Entman, 1993, Scheufele, 1999; Igar-
tua and Cheng, 2009).4 Finally, it has been stressed that the 
influence of media news also depends on the timing of the 
news release (Hastie and Park, 1986; Chong and Druck-
man, 2010). In this regard, two cases may be distinguished: 
a process of continuous information learning, whereby the 
effect of the media is captured by the accumulation of news 
received in a given period; the presence of a decay process 
of information over time, according to which only the rel-
atively recent news is relevant to forming public opinion 
(Chong and Druckman, 2010).
In exploring empirically the effects of media news on 
individual attitudes to immigration, we take all the above 
aspects into account, considering both the saliency effect 
and the tone effect as well as the interval of time in which 
news are released. Indeed, in order to consider possible het-
erogeneous effects due to the timing of the news release, 
we define different indexes of news, two with shorter time 
2 Quillon adopts a similar approach by using an index of attitudes 
towards immigration, built with the principal component methodol-
ogy.
3 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mol-
dova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the USA.
4 Entman (1993) offered the following definition of the effect in 
question: “To frame is to select some aspects of the news …and make 
them more salient… in such a way as to promote a particular prob-
lem definition, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” 
(1993, p. 52).
Footnote 1 (continued)
view in The Independent of September 3, 2015, that “anyone who 
saw those images during the night could not help but be moved and, 
as a father, I was deeply moved by the sight of that boy on a beach 
in Turkey.” He added that “Britain is a moral nation and we will ful-
fill our moral responsibilities.” German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
declared that the policy of “open door” towards refugees, recently 
announced, appeared morally and politically valid. US President 
Obama and the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau immediately 
announced plans to resettle Syrian refugees and the EU approved a 
controversial plan to relocate 120,000 migrants across the continent. 
For a review of the political and social consequences of publishing 
the photo, see Adler-Nissen et al. (2020).
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lags, and one that accumulates news over a longer period of 
time, finding that the news indexes with 1-year and 2-year 
lag exert greater effects.
From our data set on individuals, we retrieve informa-
tion about individual trust in media news, as well as politi-
cal orientation, since such factors introduce interesting 
heterogeneity in the way in which individuals respond to 
news on migration. As already pointed out, we find that the 
mass media, by simply raising the saliency of the migration 
phenomenon, may cause a reduction in positive attitudes to 
immigration. Furthermore, when the news about immigra-
tion is negatively slanted, the reduction is amplified. How-
ever, this effect materializes only when people have high 
trust in the mass media; in the event of low trust, news on 
immigration causes increased polarization of individuals’ 
preferences according to their political orientations. Indeed, 
higher exposure to news on immigration is associated to 
higher aversion only in politically right-leaning individuals, 
but the opposite effect arises in their left-leaning counter-
parts.5 This indicates that the media coverage and its context 
(frame) interact with prior beliefs of individuals in such a 
way as to further radicalize prior policy preferences of indi-
viduals on immigration. Such results highlight the crucial 
role of media trustworthiness, and are indirectly corrobo-
rated by the findings of a recent literature focusing on the 
effects of slanted political information provided by social 
media on political orientation of individuals (Alcott and 
Gentzkow, 2017; Zhuravskaya et al., 2020; Barrera et al., 
2020).
Additional interesting results come from heterogeneity 
analysis, revealing that highly educated people, in forming 
their attitudes to immigration, attach less importance to news 
on immigration, relying more on their political orientation, 
whereas less educated individuals are more exposed to the 
“saliency effect” of news on immigration, especially when 
news has a negative tone. However, also in this case, indi-
viduals’ political orientation continues to exert its influence.
The paper is structured as follows: after a review of the 
literature and the main motivations of the paper discussed 
in the “Literature and Motivations” section, the variables 
used in the empirical analysis are described in “The Model.” 
“News and Immigration Indexes” introduces the model and 
descriptive statistics. “Empirical Analysis” discusses the 
empirical results and contains a heterogeneity analysis, 
focusing on the moderating role of individuals’ level of 
education and countries’ economic development. Finally, 
“Conclusions” concludes.
Literature and Motivations
Although the issue of the effects of media news on natives’ 
attitudes to immigration has recently received widespread 
attention, the relevant literature remains scant (Vergeer 
et al., 2000; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007 and 2009; 
Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden, 2007; Igartua and Cheng, 
2009; Knoll et al., 2011; Merolla et al., 2013; Schemer, 
2012; Hericourt and Spielvogel, 2014; Facchini et al., 2017; 
Benesch et al., 2019; Meltzer et al., 2020).
In this regard, the most widely accepted hypothesis is 
that greater media coverage, by boosting the saliency of the 
immigration issue, may create alarmism and therefore can 
also erode pro-immigration attitudes. As regards the frame 
effect, it is argued that the negative (positive) tone of the 
news, by creating more aversion (empathy), can enhance 
(reduce) the negative effect of media coverage (Iyengar and 
Kinder, 1987; Entman, 1993). Despite the general agree-
ment on such hypotheses, empirical analyses have not yet 
reached unambiguous results. While some (Hericourt and 
Spielvogel, 2014; Schemer, 2012; Facchini et al., 2017; 
Benesch et al., 2019) found that raising the saliency of the 
immigration issue erodes pro-immigration attitudes, others 
(Vergeer et al., 2000; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007 
and 2009 and Meltzer et al., 2020) have reached the opposite 
conclusion.
As part of the literature has emphasized (for a review, see 
Meltzer et al. (2017)), such inconclusive empirical evidence 
can be explained by considerable individual heterogeneity 
in reactions to media news arising from differing economic 
conditions, culture, beliefs, and political orientations. For 
instance, Schuller (2016), in analyzing whether the terror-
ist attacks of 9/11 changed attitudes to immigrants, found 
that media news affects attitudes on immigration negatively 
only for individuals with a low level of education, while 
Schemer (2012) found that negative news on immigration 
affects only individuals with little issue-specific knowledge. 
Others focus on the moderating role of group-threat and 
economic conditions (Vergeer et al., 2000), and of political 
orientation (Knoll et al., 2011 and Merolla et al., 2013). Our 
paper contributes to this literature by exploring the mod-
erating role of individual political orientation and trust in 
media upon the relationship between media news and atti-
tudes to immigration. Even if we fail to solve the endogene-
ity problem, which naturally arises in this context, and thus 
5 An implicit assumption behind this interpretation is that right-lean-
ing individuals are more averse to immigration while individuals on 
the left are more favorable to it. This assumption is borne out by sev-
eral scholars (for example, Lubbers et  al., 2003; Halla et  al., 2017; 
Hatton, 2017). Furthermore, as will become clearer below, also our 
empirical results confirm the negative association with the pro-immi-
gration attitude of right-leaning individuals and the positive associa-
tion of left-leaning.
 .
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offer no causal interpretation for our results,6 we show that 
trustworthiness in the media is crucial, as individuals are 
responsive to media content only when they have high trust 
in the media; on the contrary, what drives their attitudes to 
immigration is their political orientations. This is especially 
true in the case of highly educated people, while for those 
with low education levels, media news still exerts an influ-
ence, especially when such news is negatively framed.
Our results are corroborated by recent findings on a 
related topic: how people process information they receive, 
the role of their prior beliefs in this process, and its effects 
on policy preferences on a particular issue and political 
orientation (Lenz, 2009; Gleaser and Sustein, 2009; Della 
Vigna et al., 2014; Alesina et al. 2018; Couttenier et al., 
2019; Barrera et al., 2020; Freddi, 2020). Lenz (2009), in 
analyzing the effects of media news on some salient issues, 
finds that great exposure to news on these issues does not 
change the preferences of individuals, but only conveys 
information on positions of their favorite candidates, which 
are adopted by individuals as their own. If this is the case, 
media news should polarize public opinion. Similar con-
clusions are reached by Della Vigna et al. (2014) who, on 
analyzing the effects of exposure to nationalistic content of 
Serbian public radio on the conflict between the Serbian and 
Croatian groups, find that such exposure triggered the ethnic 
conflict and polarization of political views. In both cases, the 
exposure to media news works as a prime for an issue: by 
making the latter more salient, it activates stereotypes and 
prejudices. Alesina et al. (2018), focusing on political prefer-
ences on immigration and redistribution, find results in line 
with this conclusion. Through an experiment, the authors 
obtained in a first step information regarding participants’ 
views about immigration, while in a second step, they asked 
the participants questions about their preferences regarding a 
redistribution policy. Of great relevance to the issue in hand, 
when researchers, in asking participants for their opinion on 
redistribution policies, made the issue of immigration more 
salient, respondents with a more negative view on immigra-
tion also showed less support for such policies. By contrast, 
when researchers posed the same questions without giving 
saliency to immigration, this differentiation in preferences 
for redistribution policies disappeared. The above findings 
suggest that prior beliefs of individuals, political orientation, 
and prejudices do matter for understanding the way in 
which individuals process information. Similar conclusions 
are reached by Barrera et al. (2020) who, by exploring the 
rationality of misleading statements used by politicians, find 
that misinformation on immigration produces higher support 
for right-wing parties. This effect remains even when indi-
viduals are informed about the true facts. According to the 
authors, misleading news, by giving high saliency to immi-
gration, induces a sort of “disconfirmation bias” (Edwards 
and Smith, 1996), for which, when there are strong opposing 
views about an issue, individuals become more extreme in 
their beliefs. Finally, Couttenier et al. (2019), in exploring 
how news on immigrant criminality affected voting at the 
referendum on a minaret ban in Switzerland, find that the 
strong negative bias of news about immigrant criminality 
triggered the support for the minaret ban.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the deter-
minants of individual attitudes to immigration (for a com-
prehensive survey, see Hainmuller and Hopkins (2014)). A 
major contribution of this type of literature concerns the 
distinction between economic and non-economic factors. 
Among the former is the labor market competition hypoth-
esis, according to which native attitudes depend on whether 
host country citizens compete with immigrants on the labor 
market. Within this strand are papers by Mayda (2006), 
Gang et al. (2013), Facchini and Mayda (2008), and Sch-
eve and Slaughter (2001). All the above papers find that 
unskilled workers have lower pro-immigration attitudes 
with respect to skilled workers, since immigration is, for 
the most part, formed by unskilled workers. Mayda (2006) 
finds that individual skill is positively correlated with pro-
immigration attitudes in countries where immigrants are 
unskilled, whereas the opposite holds in countries where 
immigrants are more skilled than natives. Reaching simi-
lar conclusions, Facchini and Mayda (2008) find that older 
people and unskilled workers also have a higher aversion to 
immigration since such categories are in competition with 
immigrants for welfare services.
Other authors shift the focus onto the role played by 
non-economic factors, such as culture, beliefs, political 
orientation, religion, racial orientation, and cultural distance 
(Quillian, 1995; Gang et al., 2002; Scheepers et al., 2002; 
Kunovich, 2004; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Hainmuller 
and Hiscox, 2007 and 2010; Dustman and Preston, 2007; 
Dustman et al., 2011; Schuller, 2016; Brunner and Kuhn, 
2018). The first important papers suggesting the relevance 
of non-economic factors were Quillian (1995), Kunovich 
(2004), and Scheepers et al. (2002), who provide evidence 
that opposition to immigration is rooted in perceived 
group-threats and in ethnic prejudices against immigrants 
considered as out-of-group people. Dustman and Preston 
(2007) explicitly model the influence of racially driven 
concerns in forming views about immigration, and 
6 All articles so far cited find, as in our case, only a simple correla-
tion between natives’ attitudes to immigration and the media cover-
age of the latter. Indeed, in this context several endogeneity problems 
arise, which are very difficult to overcome, especially in a framework 
of cross-country empirical analysis. The only exception is the study 
by Benesch et  al. (2019), focusing only on the German case, which 
solves the problems of endogeneity using an IV strategy, where the 
instrument consists in the referendums on immigration policies held 
in Switzerland. They find that media coverage and the tone of the 
immigration news trigger native “worries” about immigration.
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establish that racial/cultural prejudice is the main 
underlying channel through which overall attitudes are 
driven, largely overcoming welfare and labor market 
concerns. O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) include nationalist 
sentiment in their analysis of the main drivers of attitudes 
to immigration. Culture also plays a relevant role in 
explaining individual attitudes to immigration. Hainmuller 
and Hiscox (2010) find that better educated people also 
show a higher pro-immigration attitude, as they have 
a lower level of ethnocentrism, higher preferences for 
cultural diversity, and more optimistic expectations about 
the economic impact of immigration (see also Citrin et al., 
1997; Chandler and Tsai, 2001).
Our paper contributes to this literature by highlighting 
the role of cultural factors, such as the reactiveness to media 
news and further exploring the role of political orientation 
and trust in media, not widely analyzed hitherto.
Finally, our article is also related to the literature on trust 
in the media (Kiousis, 2001; Kohring and Matthes, 2007; 
Lee, 2010; Ardèvol-Abreu and De Zúñiga, 2017). A strand 
of the literature on communication studies has shown that 
the trust of individuals in the media depends on both con-
textual and individual factors: among the former are fac-
tors such as the proliferation of sources, the type of issue 
dealt with, whether general or specific, and the media bias7 
(or media “slant”) (Groseclose and Milyio, 2005). Among 
the individual factors, an important role is played by emo-
tional and psychological trust in the government and in fel-
low citizens and, above all, by political ideology and the 
partisanship of individuals (Lee, 2010). We contribute to 
this literature by exploring the indirect effects of degree of 
trust in the media on attitudes to immigration. Furthermore, 
the literature lends further empirical support to our results, 
since it shows that trust in the media interacts with politi-
cal ideology and predicts the use of news by individuals 
(Ardèvol-Abreu and De Zúñiga, 2017), findings which are 
both consistent with ours.
The Model
In its most general specification, the model proposed takes 
the following form:
Subscripts i and j refer to individual and country level 
factors, respectively. In order to obtain consistent results, 
we use the Huber robust regression approach (Huber, 1973; 
Maronna et al., 2006; Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987).
The pro-immigration index is discussed in the “Pro-immi-
gration Index” section. With regard to the right-hand side of 
the equation, News Indexj is our main variable of interest. 
The usual assumption is that i,j is iid but this is clearly vio-
lated in many cases. A natural generalization is to assume 
“clustered errors,” i.e., that observations within group j 
(within each country) are correlated in some unknown way, 
inducing correlation in i,j within j, but that groups j and k 
do not have correlated errors. In the presence of clustered 
errors, OLS estimates are still unbiased but standard errors 
may be quite wrong, leading to incorrect inference in a sur-
prisingly high proportion of finite samples. In order to over-
come this problem, we implement a pooled OLS regression 
with standard errors clustered by country.
The coverage effect (or saliency effect), as discussed 
above, can have negative effects. Extensive coverage can 
create fear as the phenomenon may be perceived as being out 
of control. The tone (frame) is a different channel through 
which media news influences public opinion (Iyengar and 
Kinder, 1987; Entman, 1993). The argument is that pub-
lic opinion is greatly influenced by the tone associated to 
reported news, which can inspire empathy or aversion for the 
issue. In order to account for such effects, we considered, in 
turn, both the total quantity of news items and negative news 
items on immigration.8
Furthermore, we extend the analysis by considering the 
moderating role of individuals’ prior beliefs, captured by 
their political orientation, and their trust in the media. The 
variables Right i,j and Lef t i,j capture respectively right- and 
left-wing political orientation of individuals, by means of 
dummy variables,9 while News Righti,j and News Lefti,j are 
the interaction terms between news exposure and individu-
als’ political orientation which vary both for countries and 
individuals. Yi and Wj are vectors of individual ( Tolerancei , 
Altruismi , Trusti , Educationi , Town Sizei , Employmenti , 
Agei , Individual Incomei , and Genderi ) and country level 
( Unemployment Ratej and GDP Growthj ) control vari-
ables, respectively. Low (reference group), medium, and 
(1)
Pro − Immigration Indexi,j = c + News Indexj + News Righti,j





7 The effects of media bias have been extensively explored else-
where. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) theoretically justify the rea-
sons for the media shaping news in order to meet consumer expec-
tations. Groseclose and Milyio (2005) find empirical evidence that 
major media in the USA have a liberal bias and propose an objective 
measure of the slant of news toward a particular political ideology. It 
has been shown that media bias can have a significant effect on politi-
cal attitudes (Stromberg, 2004; Gentozkow and Shapiro, 2004, 2006 
and 2010; Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2007).
8 If the tone is relevant, we are expected to observe a coefficient 
which is negative and greater than the total quantity of news.
9 We use three dummy variables: one for right-wing political orienta-
tion, one for left, and another for moderate political orientation. Vari-
able political orientation toward the moderates is the reference group 
in the regressions.
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high income correspond to < 15,000, 30,000 − 35,000, 
and > 58,000 Euros per year, respectively; in our case, we 
use disposable income (after tax) at individual level. Low 
and high education stand for completed primary school and 
secondary or higher degree, respectively. Small and big 
towns refer to < 2000 and > 100,000 inhabitants, respec-
tively. Our analysis considers, in turn, respondents stating 
they have high trust or no trust in media news.
Finally, we also investigate the effect of the time struc-
ture of news. The rationale is that news impacts on public 
opinion differently depending on the news release lag with 
respect to the survey release. Political scientists (Hastie and 
Park, 1986; Chong and Druckman, 2010) suggest that the 
media effect duration depends on the way people process the 
information they have been exposed to. The main distinction 
is between individuals who engage in on-line processing 
and individuals who use memory-based processing. On-line 
processors routinely integrate considerations about a specific 
issue. Hence, the information has longer time effects and 
an opinion is formed by using all the news received over 
a certain period of time, whereas memory-based process-
ing individuals use only information they can remember the 
most and are thus more influenced by recent news. The dif-
ference between the two is that on-line processing, using a 
wider spectrum of information, is likely to be less sensitive 
to media exposure.
News and Immigration Indexes
In order to study the impact of news on the attitude of natives 
to immigrants, we present in this section the main variables 
of our regression models. In particular, in the “Media News 
Index” section, we present the media news index (our main 
variable of interest) whereas the pro-immigration index (our 
dependent variable) is discussed in the “Pro-immigration 
Index” section.
Media News Index
We use the Bloomberg News platform to retrieve news 
headlines using machine-learning news analytics based on 
linguistic pattern recognition. Our underlying assumption is 
that the more relevant an event is to immigration, the wider 
the media coverage would be. Hence, the frequency of news 
reported by the media is used as an indicator of the impor-
tance of such events. Bloomberg collects news reported in 
the language in which it is published and provides a transla-
tion in English.
By means of an extensive search string, we first counted 
all news stories (see Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009; 
and Arin et al., 2017) containing the words “immigration,” 
“migrants,” and “race,” which are immigration-related but 
have no negative connotation. Then, we counted the number 
of stories that included the above words together with words 
implying a negative connotation, namely crime, discrimina-
tion, illegal immigration, hate, race, tension, and violence. 
The former would feed the News All Index whereas the latter 
feed our News Negative Index.
The main variable of interest, News, is expected to cap-
ture two different aspects of the potential news effects: cov-
erage (i.e., the extent and frequency of a particular topic cov-
ered by the media with no distinction between the positive, 
negative, or neutral tone associated to it) and the tone effect 
(i.e., the effect of the tone, whether positive or negative). 
The two indexes, labeled respectively as News Index Allj and 
News Index Negativej , are constructed as follows:
where j indicates the number of news items per country. 
The data for the News Index All and News Index Negative 
are collected from Bloomberg where news coverage is prox-
ied by story headline counts.
The above index has been widely used in the literature 
(Arin et al., 2017; Caporale et al., 2017 and 2018) and pos-
sesses some clear advantages. It allows smoothing of the raw 
number of news items, given by the count of all news and 
negative news reported by the media on this subject (termed 
News Allj and News Negativej, respectively ) .  Skewness 
toward large values would then be smoothed out across our 
sample. This is particularly important given the large hetero-
geneous set of countries considered in our empirical analy-
sis. News indexes are constructed for each country.
Pro‑immigration Index
The attitude of natives to immigration, like many socioeco-
nomic phenomena, is characterized by many factors (e.g., 
social and/or political tolerance of immigrants) that should 
be considered in constructing an indicator of attitudes to 
immigration. Accordingly, we construct a pro-immigration 
index by means of fuzzy theory which varies across coun-
try and individuals. The index is continuous and takes into 
account the whole spectrum of preferences, opinions, and 
beliefs that are expected to form native attitudes to immi-
grants. Classifying people as pro- or anti-immigration in 
dichotomous terms is a hyper-simplification of reality that 
may entail a sizeable loss of information. By contrast, fuzzy 
sets theory overcomes this issue. Furthermore, it allows 
both qualitative variables and non-ordinal classes to be 
considered.
In order to apply fuzzy theory in constructing the pro-
immigration index, the following four steps have to be taken: 
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have to be chosen; (2) the membership function (MF) must 
be constructed; (3) the weights associated to each MF have 
to be calculated; and finally, (4) the MF needs to be aggre-
gated. We identify eight categories aimed at determining 
attitudes to immigrants. Six questions from the World Val-
ues Survey Database are involved in building the index (for 
more details, see Appendix 1). For each of these (questions) 
variables, we construct the associated MF. In accordance 
with Cheli and Lemmi (1995), our MF is a A(x) func-
tion that takes values in the interval [0; 1]. In particular, 
A(x) = 1 identifies full achievement of the target (a resident 
very inclined to host an immigrant), A(x) = 0 denotes poor 
achievement (a resident little inclined to host an immigrant), 
and 0 < 𝜇A(x) < 1 denotes a situation in between the two 
extremes. The notion of frequency is considered to define 
the membership function (for more details, see Lelli (2001)).
Finally, for any individual the six specific MFs calcu-
lated (one MF per question) are combined by means of the 
weighted arithmetic mean (for more details see Cheli and 
Lemmi 1995; Zani et al. 2010, 2011).
Therefore, a weight sensitive to the fuzzy membership is 
assigned to each variable. Zani et al. (2011) suggest com-
paring the solutions obtained by different weighting crite-
ria, “in order to gain insight into the stability of the pat-
tern highlighted by the different methods.” We compute the 
fuzzy composite index considering three distinct weighting 
criteria:
• w1—equal weight for each variable;
• w2—normalized weights as inverse functions of the 
fuzzy proportion of each variable;
• w3—normalized factor loadings applying principal 
component analysis (PCA) on the rank correlation matrix 
(Zani et al. 2010; OECD, 2008). This criterion will be con-
sidered only if the first component explains more than 30% 
of total variability (Zani et al. 2010 and 2011).10
Table 1 shows the correlation coefficients among fuzzy 
indicators obtained using different weighting criteria. Pair-
wise correlations appear to be very high (always greater than 
0.86) regardless of the weighting criteria used. Therefore, 
only results using w3 are reported (weights are reported in 
Table 12 in Appendix 1).
Control Variables
Identification of a causal impact of media coverage on 
natives’ attitudes is challenging for several reasons. 
First, attitudes and preferences concerning immigra-
tion are due to several unobservable individual char-
acteristics such as altruism, psychological attitudes to 
new and different people, fear, and the degree of self-
confidence. These unobservable components are also 
correlated with the probability that individuals read 
particular journals and magazines, and are sources of 
self-selection. Moreover, there is reverse causality: 
newspapers report what their readers look for; hence, 
the attitudes of individuals affect the news reported in 
the newspapers that individuals read. We do not address 
all these sources of endogeneity concerns, which is why 
our results are simple correlations. However, we miti-
gate the potential bias deriving from self-selection and 
unobservable covariates, controlling for a number of 
variables at individual and country level that can be 
confounding factors.
A first set of control variables, at individual level, 
captures personal attitudes, beliefs, and ideological posi-
tions. In particular, we control for the degree of toler-
ance, trust in others, and degree of altruism. Moreover, 
we also account for age and gender (a dummy where male 
is equal to one) since some authors (Facchini and Mayda, 
2008) find that pro-immigration attitudes attenuate with 
age, while males have a lower pro-immigration attitude. 
Individual socioeconomic background is measured by 
working status (which is a dummy variable equal to one if 
employed, and zero otherwise), and the skills level of the 
respondent, in order to test the hypothesis that the unem-
ployed and less educated workers have lower pro-immi-
grant attitudes. Finally, we account for income (those with 
lower income may feel they are competing with immi-
grants for welfare state services), respondent geographical 
location (size of the town where respondents live), and 
individual country macro-economic conditions, measured 
by GDP per capita growth, and unemployment (countries 
with more solid macro fundamentals are expected to be 
more open to immigration).
Table 1  Pairwise correlations 
among fuzzy composite 
indicators
Correlation coefficients among 




w3 0.9676 0.8643 1
10 The choice of the proper number of principal components takes 
place on the basis of three criteria which take into account their 
explanatory power. First we consider a number of principal compo-
nents which take into account at least 95% of the variance of each 
of the k initial variables, which imposes a minimal threshold; sec-
ond, we retain all the principal components whose eigenvalue is 
larger than 1; third, we observe the screen plot of the eigenvalues as 
a function of the number of principal components; as eigenvalues are 
obtained in decreasing order, the graph will show a decreasing curve, 
with a kink in correspondence to the proper number of principal com-
ponents. In particular, on the basis of the results of the analysis, we 
choose only three principal components.
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Empirical Analysis
We use data from the World Values Survey Database, Wave 
5, 2005–2009, for 19 countries.11 Surveys were conducted 
towards the end of the 2005–2009 period with, on average, 
around one thousand respondents per country for a total of 
18,504 observations, while data for the news indexes (All 
News and Negative News) were collected from Bloomberg. 
The description of the data is reported in Appendix 1, in 
what follows we discuss the empirical results.
Empirical Results
The empirical results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. In 
Model I, in order to estimate the effect of news, we use the 
1-year lag news index12 (i.e., the index is constructed with 
news reported on the year before the survey was released); in 
Model II, we use the 2-year lag news index, constructed with 
news reported 2 years before; and finally in Model III, we 
use a cumulative news index measured by news issued from 
1 to 6 years before the survey was released. The time lags of 
the news index can also help reduce endogeneity concerns.
The results obtained show that there is a difference 
between people with high trust in media news and those 
with low trust in media news. In the former case the cover-
age of news on immigration (captured by all news) shows a 
negative and statistically significant correlation with the pro-
immigrant index (see the first three columns of Table 2). The 
same occurs when we consider the tone of news: the coef-
ficient is negative and significant, even if the negative tone 
shows a larger coefficient with respect to news coverage (see 
the first three columns of Table 3). The coefficients of inter-
action terms, News Righti,j and News Lefti,j, , are respectively 
negative and positive, but not statistically significant. The 
political orientation variables show that right-wing individu-
als have a negative propensity towards immigration, whereas 
their left-wing counterparts have a higher pro-immigration 
attitude.13
The negative sign of media coverage is consistent with 
the hypothesis that a wide coverage may create alarmism, 
in the sense that the phenomenon is believed to be out of 
control. Obviously if the tone of the news is negative, this 
effect is amplified. By contrast, prior beliefs do not seem to 
modify this correlation.
The picture changes when we analyze individuals who 
do not trust the media. In this case, media coverage and the 
tone effect are not statistically significant, even if both coef-
ficients have a negative sign, as in the previous case. By con-
trast, the interaction terms, News Righti,j and News Lefti,j, 
show statistically significant coefficients, with respectively 
negative and positive sign. These findings are consistent 
with the hypothesis that, when individuals do not rely on 
the media for information, high exposure to immigration 
news increases the saliency of this issue in the minds of 
individuals who react by reinforcing their previous beliefs.14
Finally, the time structure of news reveals that all indexes, 
1- and 2-year lag indexes as well as the cumulative index, 
influence pro-immigration attitudes. However, the main 
effects occur when 1-year and 2-year lag news is consid-
ered, indicating a dominance of memory-based individuals.
Control variables at individual level, such as tolerance, 
altruism, and trust, are all statistically significant and have 
a positive sign as expected. Since employment also has a 
positive sign, labor market competition can reduce the pro-
pensity for immigration, a finding which is in line with the 
literature (Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnot, 2006). Age 
shows a negative sign; this implies that older people have a 
lower pro-immigration index, which also agrees with find-
ings reported elsewhere (Mayda, 2006). Variables capturing 
income and education show that people with higher incomes 
(≥ Euros 58,000) have a higher pro-immigration attitude 
compared to those with low (Euros 15,000) and medium 
(Euros 30,000–35,000) incomes. A similar pattern emerges 
with respect to a higher level of education (secondary school 
or degree) which has a greater effect on pro-immigration 
attitudes compared to low education (primary school). These 
results confirm those obtained by Mayda (2006) and Hain-
mueller and Hiscox (2007), even if it is not clear whether 
they depend on the market labor channel or on different cul-
tural attitudes of the more skilled. Finally, we found that 
individuals living in large towns (population ≥ 100,000) 
have a higher pro-immigration attitude. This result confirms 
the greater “openness” of those living in more urbanized 
areas already found elsewhere. Overall, our results confirm 
the important role of some individual variables, although 
it is not always clear whether this depends on cultural or 
11 We opted not to consider the latest data released by the World Val-
ues Survey Database, Wave 6, 2010–2014, in order to avoid possible 
distortions following the recent global crisis. As already stated, we 
consider the following countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Georgia, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Ser-
bia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine, and the USA.
12 Please note that as survey releases vary across countries, the news 
indexes were calculated to accommodate such differences.
13 These results have to be interpreted with respect to the reference 
point given by individuals with a moderate political orientation.
14 In the case of negatively slanted news, the positive sign of the 
interaction term News Lefti seems to indicate the presence of a 
“Backfire effect” (Swire et  al. 2017), whereby information is evalu-
ated in a biased way, which reinforces pre-existing beliefs (see also 
Barrera et al. 2020).
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economic motives given the strong interrelationship between 
the two.
Control variables at country level, unemployment, 
and GDP per capita are statistically significant, with the 
estimated coefficients indicating respectively a negative 
(unemployment) and positive (GDP per capita) effect, as 
one would expect. The effect of unemployment confirms 
the importance of labor market channels: in the case of 
high unemployment, people do not prefer high immigra-
tion levels because of market competition, while a high 
level of development makes countries more open and 
favorable to immigration given not only the greater eco-
nomic opportunities but also the different effects that the 
level of development has on the skills composition of 
workers. However, the level of GDP per capita growth 
can also capture other characteristics of countries not 
Table 3  Regression results—pro-immigration index and negative news
*** , **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors (reported in brackets) were clus-
tered by country. The News index is equal to ln[e + negative news story counts]. Models I and II use the news index based on the total number 
of negative news items released 1 year and 2 years before the survey was released, respectively. Model III refers to the total number of negative 
news items issued in the 5-year interval before the survey was released. Respondents are grouped according to whether they declared hav-
ing high trust and no trust in media news. Income low, medium, and high are equal to < 15,000, 30,000–35,000, and > 58,000 Euros per year, 
respectively. Education low and high stand for completed primary school and secondary or higher degree, respectively. Small and big towns refer 
to < 2000 and > 100,000 habitants, respectively
High trust in media news No trust in media news
Model I II III I II III
Negative news
News  − 0.0205 ∗  ∗  ∗  − 0.0181 ∗  ∗  − 0.0046 ∗  ∗  − 0.0024  − 0.0045  − 0.0011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
News right  − 0.0201  − 0.0176  − 0.0045 ∗  − 0.0134 ∗  ∗  − 0.0121 ∗  ∗  − 0.0022 ∗  ∗ 
(0.124) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
News left 0.0119 0.0157 0.0029 0.0135 ∗  ∗ 0.0143 ∗  ∗ 0.0029 ∗  ∗ 
(0.125) (0.011) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Political orientation (reference group: moderate)
Right  − 0.0066  − 0.0064  − 0.0067  − 0.0029  − 0.0032  − 0.0033
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Left 0.0477 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0476 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0478 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0435 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0436 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0434 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Country level control variables
Unemployment rate  − 0.0091 ∗  ∗  ∗ GDP growth 0.0016 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.000) (0.000)
Individual level control variables
Tolerance 0.0501 ∗  ∗  ∗ Income (reference group: low income)
(0.004)
Altruism 0.0236 ∗  ∗  ∗ Medium income 0.0058
(0.004) (0.011)
Trust 0.0976 ∗  ∗  ∗ High income 0.0919 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.004) (0.013)
Employment 0.0243 ∗  ∗  ∗ Education (reference group: low education)
(0.004)
Age  − 0.0005 ∗  ∗  ∗ High education 0.0893 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.000) (0.031)
Gender  − 0.0042 Cities (reference group: small town)
(0.0041)
Large town 0.0265 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.007)
R2 0.279 0.276 0.278 0.277 0.289 0.278
Obs 18,504 18,504 18,504 18,504 18,504 18,504
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completely limited to labor market factors, such as the 
level of social capital and a lower level of criminality. 
However, we were unable to disentangle the different types 
of motivations.
Heterogeneity and Robustness
In this section, we analyze whether there are differences in 
the reactions to news on immigration driven by some char-
acteristics at country and individual level. In particular, we 
consider countries’ economic development and individuals’ 
Table 4  Regression results—
pro-immigration index and all 
news for developed countries
*** , **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors (reported in brackets) were clustered by country. High income (developed) countries are selected 
according to the World Bank’s Classification of Countries by Income 2009. The countries are Cyprus, Fin-
land, Germany, Italy, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA. Individual and country 
level controls are included in the estimation. Please refer to Table 2 for the set of control variables
High trust in media news No trust in media news
Model I II III I II III
All news
News  − 0.0120 ∗  ∗  − 0.0070 ∗  ∗  − 0.0025 ∗  ∗  − 0.0014  − 0.0022  − 0.0003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
News right  − 0.0054  − 0.0088  − 0.0032 ∗  − 0.0063 ∗  ∗  − 0.0058 ∗  ∗  − 0.0014 ∗ 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
News left 0.0058 0.0081 0.0016 0.0064 ∗  ∗ 0.0068 ∗  ∗ 0.0016 ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Political orientation (reference group: moderate)
Right  − 0.0066  − 0.0064  − 0.0067  − 0.0029  − 0.0032  − 0.0034
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Left 0.0477 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0480 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0478 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0435 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0436 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0435 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.277 0.276 0.245 0.277 0.278 0.276
Obs 8980 8980 8980 8980 8980 8980
Table 5  Regression results—
pro-immigration index and all 
news for developing countries
*** , **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors (reported in brackets) were clustered by country. Low income (developing) countries are selected 
according to the World Bank’s Classification of Countries by Income 2009. The countries are Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, and Ukraine. Individual 
and country level controls are included in the estimation. Please refer to Table 2 for the set of control vari-
ables
High trust in media news No trust in media news
Model I II III I II III
All news
News  − 0.0101 ∗  ∗  − 0.0090 ∗  ∗  − 0.0022 ∗  ∗  − 0.0014  − 0.0023  − 0.0005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
News right  − 0.0096  − 0.0088  − 0.0021 ∗  − 0.0062 ∗  ∗  − 0.0037 ∗  ∗  − 0.0031 ∗ 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
News left 0.0258*** 0.0282*** 0.0104** 0.0024 ∗  ∗ 0.0057 ∗  ∗ 0.0015 ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Political orientation (reference group: moderate)
Right  − 0.0066  − 0.0064  − 0.0067  − 0.0020  − 0.0042  − 0.0034
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Left 0.0477 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0480 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0478 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0405 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0436 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0435 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.277 0.276 0.280 0.280 0.276 0.281
Obs 9524 9524 9524 9524 9524 9524
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level of education as possible sources of heterogeneous reac-
tions to news on immigration.
Some authors (Facchini et al., 2008; Chang and Kang, 
2018) find that the native population in more developed 
countries shows a higher pro-immigrant attitude, trig-
gered by better economic conditions and higher trust in 
institutions (Chang and Kang, 2018). If this is true, it can 
be argued that people living in developed countries show a 
less adverse reaction to news on immigration. In order to test 
such a hypothesis, we run our estimations for two separate 
groups, one made of high income (developed) countries and 
another by low income (developing) countries. We use the 
Table 6  Regression results—
pro-immigration index and 
negative news for developed 
countries
*** , **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors (reported in brackets) were clustered by country. High income (developed) countries are selected 
according to the World Bank’s Classification of Countries by Income 2009. The countries are Cyprus, Fin-
land, Germany, Italy, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA. Individual and country 
level controls are included in the estimation. Please refer to Table 2 for the set of control variables
High trust in media news No trust in media news
Model I II III I II III
Negative news
News  − 0.0277 ∗  ∗  ∗  − 0.0181 ∗  ∗  − 0.0045 ∗  ∗  − 0.0034  − 0.0044  − 0.0021
(0.009) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
News right  − 0.0001  − 0.0176  − 0.0046 ∗  − 0.0134 ∗  ∗  − 0.0121 ∗  ∗  − 0.0022 ∗  ∗ 
(0.124) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
News left 0.0109 0.0125 0.0029 0.0135 ∗  ∗ 0.0143 ∗  ∗ 0.0030 ∗  ∗ 
(0.125) (0.011) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Political orientation (reference group: moderate)
Right  − 0.0066  − 0.0064  − 0.0067  − 0.0029  − 0.0032  − 0.0033
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Left 0.0477 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0476 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0478 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0435 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0436 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0434 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.279 0.276 0.278 0.277 0.289 0.278
Obs 8,980 8,980 8,980 8,980 8,980 8,980
Table 7  Regression results—
pro-immigration index and 
negative news for developing 
countries
*** , **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors (reported in brackets) were clustered by country. Low income (developing) countries are selected 
according to the World Bank’s Classification of Countries by Income 2009. The countries are Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, and Ukraine. Individual 
and country level controls are included in the estimation. Please refer to Table 2 for the set of control vari-
ables
High trust in media news No trust in media news
Model I II III I II III
Negative news
News  − 0.0205 ∗  ∗  ∗  − 0.0181 ∗  ∗  − 0.0046 ∗  ∗  − 0.0024  − 0.0045  − 0.0011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
News right  − 0.0201  − 0.0176  − 0.0045 ∗  − 0.0134 ∗  ∗  − 0.0121 ∗  ∗  − 0.0022 ∗  ∗ 
(0.124) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
News left 0.0116*** 0.0107** 0.0329*** 0.0135 ∗  ∗ 0.0123 ∗  ∗ 0.0021 ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Political orientation (reference group: moderate)
Right  − 0.0066  − 0.0064  − 0.0067  − 0.0029  − 0.0032  − 0.0033
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Left 0.0477 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0476 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0478 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0435 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0436 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0434 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.279 0.276 0.278 0.277 0.289 0.278
Obs 8,980 8,980 8,980 8,980 8,980 8,980
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World Bank’s Classification of Countries by Income 2009.15 
Results, reported in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7, do not corroborate 
this hypothesis as findings for both groups do not appear to 
differ substantially from one another and are in line with 
those obtained for the whole sample.
The level of education may affect both attitudes to immi-
gration (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006; Hain-
mueller and Hiscox, 2007 and 2010; Schuller, 2016) and 
the way in which individuals process information from the 
media. Therefore, we also investigate whether the level 
Table 9  Regression results—
pro-immigration index and 
all news for people with low 
education
*** , **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors (reported in brackets) were clustered by country. Respondents with a primary education degree are 
classified as people with low education. Individual and country level controls are included in the estima-
tion. Please refer to Table 2 for the set of control variables with the exclusion of the education variable
High trust in media news No trust in media news
Model I II III I II III
All news
News  − 0.0221***  − 0.0879***  − 0.0312***  − 0.0214***  − 0.0623***  − 0.0655***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
News right  − 0.0096  − 0.0098  − 0.0032 ∗  − 0.0062 ∗  ∗  − 0.0055 ∗  ∗  − 0.0012 ∗ 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
News left 0.0052 0.0082 0.0025 0.0068 ∗  ∗ 0.0065 ∗  ∗ 0.0033 ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Political orientation (reference group: moderate)
Right  − 0.0066  − 0.0064  − 0.0067  − 0.0029  − 0.0032  − 0.0034
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Left 0.0477 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0480 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0478 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0435 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0436 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0435 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.289 0.290 0.280 0.279 0.278 0.281
Obs 13,965 13,965 13,965 13,965 13,965 13,965
Table 10  Regression results—
pro-immigration index and 
negative news for people with 
high education
*** , **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors (reported in brackets) were clustered by country. Respondents with a secondary or higher qualifica-
tion are classified as people with high education. Individual and country level controls are included in the 
estimation. Please refer to Table 2 for the set of control variables with the exclusion of the education vari-
able
High trust in media news No trust in media news
Model I II III I II III
Negative news
News  − 0.0015  − 0.0081  − 0.0016  − 0.0024  − 0.0045  − 0.0011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
News right  − 0.0202  − 0.0146  − 0.0065 ∗  − 0.0124 ∗  ∗  − 0.0132 ∗  ∗  − 0.0032 ∗  ∗ 
(0.124) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
News left 0.0119 0.0157 0.0029 0.0135 ∗  ∗ 0.0143 ∗  ∗ 0.0030 ∗  ∗ 
(0.125) (0.011) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Political orientation (reference group: moderate)
Right  − 0.0066  − 0.0064  − 0.0067  − 0.0029  − 0.0032  − 0.0033
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Left 0.0477 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0476 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0478 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0435 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0436 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0434 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.279 0.276 0.276 0.265 0.285 0.278
Obs 4,539 4,539 4,539 4,539 4,539 4,539
15 Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Turkey, and Ukraine are grouped as low income 
countries, whereas Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Slo-
venia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA belong to the high 
income group. Note that the two groups would also be consistent 
with Eastern vs. Western European countries with the only noticeable 
exception for the USA added to the Western European group.
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of education moderates the reaction to news on immigra-
tion. To this end, we split the sample into two sub-samples 
according to individuals’ level of education (low or high).16
The results, reported in Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11, are con-
sistent with our previous findings. However, it appears that 
in the case of people educated to a low level, even for those 
with no trust in the media, the coefficients associated to All 
News, as well as Negative News, variables are always nega-
tive and statistically significant even for those with no trust 
in the media, while in the case of the highly educated, those 
coefficients are still negative (with a smaller magnitude in 
absolute value) and not statistically significant. We interpret 
these results as evidence that education does affect reac-
tions to news on immigration, as the highly educated, in 
forming their attitudes to immigration, rely more on their 
prior beliefs. In this respect, our results are consistent with 
findings of Schuller (2016) who, in analyzing the effects on 
pro-immigration attitude of news related to the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks, shows that educated people are 
less influenced by negative news.
Finally, to check the robustness of our whole sample 
results, we also estimate the model with countries’ fixed 
effects (see Tables 15, 16, 17, 18 in Appendix 2). The fixed 
effect specification does not allow us to include unemploy-
ment, GDP per capita growth, or the News indicator as the 
above variables are country-specific. The results, however, 
as far as the interaction terms are concerned, are in line with 
Table 11  Regression results—
pro-immigration index and 
negative news for people with 
low education
*** , **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors (reported in brackets) were clustered by country. Respondents with a primary degree are classified 
as people with low education. Individual and country level controls are included in the estimation. Please 
refer to Table 2 for the set of control variables with the exclusion of the education variable
High trust in media news No trust in media news
Model I II III I II III
Negative news
News  − 0.0465 ∗  ∗  ∗  − 0.0133***  − 0.0226***  − 0.0324***  − 0.0245***  − 0.0211***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000)
News right  − 0.0201  − 0.0176  − 0.0045 ∗  − 0.0134 ∗  ∗  − 0.0121 ∗  ∗  − 0.0032 ∗  ∗ 
(0.124) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
News left 0.0119 0.0157 0.0029 0.0135*** 0.0123*** 0.0043 ∗  ∗ 
(0.125) (0.011) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Political orientation (reference group: moderate)
Right  − 0.0056  − 0.0044  − 0.0069  − 0.0030  − 0.0031  − 0.0033
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Left 0.0477 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0476 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0478 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0435 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0436 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0434 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.279 0.276 0.278 0.277 0.233 0.230
Obs 13,965 13,965 13,965 13,965 13,965 13,965
Table 12  Member function weights
w2 are normalized weights calculated as inverse functions of the fuzzy 
proportion of each variable, according to Eq. (5). W3 are normalized 
factor loadings by means of PCA (principal component analysis)
Variables w2 w3
Social tolerance 0.03365 0.12367
Economic tolerance 0.25075 0.04889
Political tolerance 0.08775 0.07582
Trust 0.09522 0.11409
A. Requisites for citizenship 0.10612 0.17077
B. Requisites for citizenship 0.11637 0.16691
C. Requisites for citizenship 0.18220 0.12244
Ethnic diversity 0.12793 0.17740
Total 1 1
Fig. 1  Pro-immigrant index distributions for political orientation
16 Respondents with a primary degree are classified as people with 
low education, whereas those with a secondary degree or higher are 
classified as highly educated.
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our previous results, confirming the difference between peo-
ple with high trust in media news and those with low trust 
in media news. The interaction terms, News Righti,j and 
News Lefti,j , confirm our previous findings showing statisti-
cally significant coefficients, with respectively negative and 
positive signs. A negative and statistically significant effect 
of individuals with right-wing political orientation is now 
found.
Conclusions
This paper analyzed the effects of media coverage on indi-
viduals’ pro-immigration attitudes. The novel pro-immi-
gration attitude index proposed was calculated by means 
of a fuzzy approach. The results can be summarized as fol-
lows: both the coverage and negative tone of news attenu-
ate pro-immigration attitudes, albeit only for those with 
high trust in the media. By contrast, for individuals with 
no trust in the media, news on immigration strengthens 
the effects of political orientations, further eroding the 
pro-immigration attitude in the case of individuals with 
negative prior preferences (right-leaning), while increas-
ing the pro-immigration attitude in the case of individuals 
with positive prior preferences (left-leaning). Therefore, 
in the latter case, media news radicalizes individuals’ prior 
preferences on immigration, captured by their political 
orientation.
Fig. 2  Pro-immigration index distributions conditional upon the 
degree of trust in news (high trust and no trust)
Table 13  Descriptive statistics
The pro-immigration index is calculated according to fuzzy set theory described in the “Pro-immigration 
Index” section. Right and Left measure political orientation. The moderate political orientation is omit-
ted because it represents the reference class. For this reason, the sum of individuals who claim to vote 
for left-wing and right-wing parties is not equal to the number of observations related to the immigration 
index. C.V. stands for the coefficient variation (or relative standard deviation). This is reported instead of 
the standard second moment as mean values are substantially different across countries
Pro-immigration index Right Left
Countries Obs Mean C.V Min Max Obs Mean C.V Obs Mean C.V
Bulgaria 661 0.431 0.422 0.004 0.957 97 0.189 2.061 178 0.346 1.375
Cyprus 1.017 0.430 0.467 0.000 0.981 244 0.255 1.709 317 0.331 1.441
Finland 929 0.544 0.402 0.000 1 272 0.321 1.451 212 0.249 1.738
Georgia 1.09 0.317 0.507 0.004 0.931 250 0.362 1.328 91 0.132 2.556
Germany 1.559 0.504 0.461 0.000 1 239 0.167 2.215 550 0.384 1.265
Hungary 892 0.405 0.397 0.000 0.981 221 0.281 1.603 135 0.171 2.208
Italy 813 0.491 0.425 0.000 0.993 164 0.264 1.671 265 0.428 1.156
Moldova 922 0.423 0.413 0.000 0.991 282 0.377 1.286 156 0.208 1.951
Norway 978 0.661 0.352 0.000 1 331 0.345 1.379 276 0.287 1.574
Poland 784 0.408 0 424 0.033 0.993 197 0.326 1.438 102 0.169 2.218
Romania 1.18 0.488 0.415 0.000 0.993 291 0.403 1.238 122 0.148 1.541
Serbia 1.209 0.441 0.437 0.067 0.993 250 0.212 1.929 505 0.474 1.052
Slovenia 784 0.449 0.487 0.000 1 131 0.244 1.766 147 0.274 1.627
Spain 861 0.463 0.434 0.000 1 144 0.187 2.091 381 0.496 1.011
Sweden 897 0.801 0.228 0.021 1 342 0.389 1.254 306 0.348 1.367
Switzerland 1.084 0.611 0.355 0.037 1 262 0.267 1.655 335 0.341 1.391
Turkey 1.067 0.431 0.482 0.000 0.988 390 0.421 1.171 239 0.257 1.701
Ukraine 635 0.481 0 392 0.081 120 0.279 1.609 76 0.176 2.164
United States 1.142 0 499 0 422 0.000 0.993 314 0.278 1.539 199 0.183 1.863
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Appendix 1
Indicators Used for the Pro‑immigration Index
The variables used for calculating the pro-immigration index 
can be grouped into eight categories. The eight categories 
and associated questions, taken from World Values Survey 
Database, are the following:
i) Social tolerance—Do you want immigrants/foreign 
workers as neighbors? This question returns a dichoto-
mous response: yes (value 1) or no (value 2);
ii) Economic tolerance—When jobs are scarce, employers 
should give priority to [domestic] people over immi-
grants. This question returns a polytomous response: 
Agree (value 1), Neither (value 2), Disagree (value 3);
iii) Political tolerance—How about people from other coun-
tries coming here to work? Which of the following do 
you think the government should do? This question 
returns a polytomous response: Let anyone come who 
wants to? (value 1), Let people come as long as there 
are jobs available? (value 2), Place strict limits on the 
number of foreigners who can come here? (value 3), 
Prohibit people from coming here from other countries? 
(value 4);
iv) Trust—I’d like to ask you how much you trust people 
from various groups. Could you tell me whether you 
trust people of another nationality completely, some-
what, not very much or not at all? This question returns 
a polytomous response: trust completely (value 1), trust 
somewhat (value 2), do not trust very much (value 3), 
do not trust at all (value 4);
v) Requisites for citizenship—In your opinion, how impor-
tant should the following be as requirements for some-
body seeking citizenship of your country? Specify for 
each requirement if you consider it very important, 
rather important or not important. In this case, we iden-
tify three questions concerning requirements for citizen-
ship: (a) Having ancestors from my country; (b) Being 
born on my country’s soil; (c) Adopting the customs 
of my country—The questions return a polytomous 
response: very important (value 1); rather important 
(value 2); not important (value 3);
vi) Ethnic diversity—Turning to the question of ethnic 
diversity, with which of the following views do you 
agree? Please use this scale to indicate your position. 
This question returns a polytomous response: ethnic 
diversity erodes a country’s unity (value 1), …, ethnic 
diversity enriches life (value 10).
Weights associated to each member function are reported 
in Table 12
Data Descriptive Statistics
A first visual summary of the pro-immigrant index distri-
butions due to political orientation is provided in Fig. 1. It 
can be seen from this figure that the distributions are quite 
similar for people who vote right and moderate. In particu-
lar, we note that the modal value of the indicator is about 
0.4. By contrast, the distribution of the indicator for people 
who vote for left-wing parties shifts to the right, showing 
greater propensity toward immigration. Moreover, the dis-
tribution is bimodal, with the higher mode characterized by 
lower propensity toward immigration (with a value slightly 
higher than 0.4); hence, the left-leaning people show a 
higher heterogeneity
Furthermore, we report the pro-immigration index distri-
butions conditional upon the degree of trust in news (high 
trust and no trust). The unconditional distribution is also 
shown as the benchmark distribution. Figure 2 shows the 
distributions in this case.
We observe that the distribution of people with high con-
fidence in news is more concentrated around the median 
value, with tails lower than those of the distribution of 
people with low confidence. We interpret this behavior of 
the distribution as evidence of a process of convergence in 
opinion in case of high trust in media. The distribution of 
Table 14  Descriptive statistics (cont.)
The News index used has the following form: News index all (nega-
tive) = ln[e + News all (negative)]





















United States 44.11 21.41
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people with no trust in news is very similar to the benchmark 
distribution except for the extreme values. With respect to 
the distribution of people with high trust in news, it is less 
concentrated around the median value and has the right tail 
fatter. We interpret this behavior of the distribution as evi-
dence of a higher heterogeneity in opinion which is more 
polarized. Reassuringly, in case of high trust in media, it 
seems that news convey towards a convergence of opinions, 
by reducing the effects of prior beliefs.
Tables 13 and 14 present a set of descriptive statistics for 
the variables of interest. The pro-immigration index average is 
particularly high in the cases of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and 
Switzerland, albeit experiencing higher volatility. Georgia has 
the lowest (0.317), whereas the remaining 14 countries con-
sidered range between 0.408 (Poland) and 0.499 (USA). On 
average, individual respondents who stated they had a political 
orientation to the right or left were almost equally split, with 
ten countries out of 19 showing a higher percentage associated 
to a right-wing political orientation. Descriptive statistics on 
news are also very informative. Countries with the most expo-
sure to news on immigration are Germany, Italy, Spain, and 
the USA, whereas eastern European countries appear to be the 
least exposed. A similar pattern is observed when we look at 
countries highly exposed to negative news, whereas Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Finland, Moldova, and Serbia appear to be the least 
exposed to negative news.
Table 15  Fixed effects regression results—pro-immigration index and all news for developed countries
*** , **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors (reported in brackets) were clus-
tered by country. High income (developed) countries are selected according to the World Bank’s Classification of Countries by Income 2009. 
The countries are Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA
High trust in 
media news
No trust in media news
Model I II III I II III
All news
News right 0.0016 0.0036* 0.0006  − 0.0040 ∗  ∗  − 0.0044 ∗  − 0.0006
(0.002) (0.017) (0.0005) (0.015) (0.002) (0.0003)
News left  − 0.0011  − 0.0014  − 0.0006 0.0078 ∗  ∗ 0.009*** 0.0020 ∗  ∗ 
(0.004) (0.029) (0.0008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.0008)
Political orientation (reference group: moderate)
Right  − 0.0176**  − 0.0183**  − 0.0183**  − 0.0113*  − 0.0132*  − 0.0128**
(0.006) (0.067) (0.006) (0.060) (0.006) (0.006)
Left 0.0361 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0374 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0372 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0250 ∗  ∗ 0.0262 ∗  ∗ 0.0261 ∗  ∗ 
(0.008) (0.081) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual level control variables
Tolerance 0.0177 ∗  ∗  ∗ Income (reference group: low income)
(0.004)
Altruism 0.0204 ∗  ∗  ∗ Medium income 0.0083
(0.004) (0.093)
Trust 0.0545 ∗  ∗  ∗ High income 0.0175 ∗  ∗ 
(0.006) (0.068)
Employment 0.088 ∗ Education (reference group: low education)
(0.004)
Age  − 0.0006 ∗  ∗  ∗ High education 0.0654 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.000) (0.090)
Gender  − 0.0019
(0.0027) Cities (reference group: small town)
Large town 0.0200 ∗  ∗  ∗ (0.005)
R2 0.251 0.252 0.251 0.253 0.252 0.253
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Table 17  Fixed effects regression results—pro-immigration index and negative news for developed countries
*** , **, and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors (reported in brackets) were clus-
tered by country. High income (developed) countries are selected according to the World Bank’s Classification of Countries by Income 2009. 
The countries are Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA
High trust in 
media news
No trust in media news
Model I II III I II III
Negative news
News right 0.0012  − 0.0015* 0.0004  − 0.0020  − 0.0009  − 0.0002
(0.001) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.035) (0.0009) (0.0002)
News left  − 0.0007  − 0.0014  − 0.0005 0.0096*** 0.0070** 0.0020**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.0008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0008)
Political orientation (reference group: moderate)
Right  − 0.0210**  − 0.0220**  − 0.0219**  − 0.0142  − 0.016*  − 0.0164*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.085) (0.008) (0.008)
Left 0.0487 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0494 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0498 ∗  ∗  ∗ 0.0354** 0.0369** 0.0366**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual level control variables
Tolerance 0.0402 ∗  ∗  ∗ Income (reference group: low income)
(0.004)
Altruism 0.0462 ∗  ∗  ∗ Income medium 0.0296
(0.004) (0.016)
Trust 0.0835 ∗  ∗  ∗ Income high 0.0340 ∗  ∗ 
(0.007) (0.013)
Employment 0.014
(0.010) Education (reference group: low educa-
tion)
Age  − 0.0010 ∗  ∗  ∗ Education high 0.0963 ∗  ∗  ∗ 
(0.000) (0.017)
Gender  − 0.0031
(0.0041) Cities (reference group: small town)
Large town 0.0201 ∗  ∗  ∗ (0.004)
R2 0.318 0.312 0.301 0.332 0.311 0.291
Obs 8,980 8,980 8,980 8,980 8,980 8,980
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Data Availability Data are available on request from the authors.
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